From PGP to Mythos: a brief history of export controls that didn’t stop anyone

The White House recently ordered Anthropic to restrict the export of its advanced AI models, Fable and Mythos, citing national security concerns. This move, which led Anthropic to pull both models, marks the first significant test of the U.S. government's ability to control frontier AI through export controls, a strategy previously applied with mixed results to encryption and spyware. The outcome of this standoff could significantly influence Anthropic's access to international markets and shape future regulations for other AI developers.

Anthropic had previously marketed Mythos as a critical tool for cybersecurity defense, limiting its access to approximately 150 vetted organizations due to its potent capabilities. The immediate cause for the ban reportedly stemmed from two incidents: Anthropic granting access to a South Korean telecom company suspected of ties to China, and Amazon researchers allegedly circumventing Fable 5's safeguards. These events prompted the Commerce Department to issue an export control directive, leading to Anthropic's rapid withdrawal of access to its products.

Historically, governments have struggled to effectively control the proliferation of what they deem dangerous cyber technologies. A notable example is the "Crypto Wars" of the 1990s, where the U.S. government attempted to restrict the export of encryption software like Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Its creator, Phil Zimmermann, famously circumvented these controls by publishing PGP's source code, ultimately contributing to the widespread adoption of end-to-end encryption.

Similar challenges arose in the 2010s with Western-made spyware. Despite efforts to expand the Wassenaar Arrangement to regulate dual-use surveillance technologies, the agreement faced inherent weaknesses. Many countries, including major players in the spyware industry, did not adhere to it, and its application remained discretionary. This allowed companies to continue exporting surveillance tools to oppressive regimes, often by relocating operations to countries with more lenient export controls.